Richmond Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 10 | Issue 5

Article 6

2004

Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy eDiscovery Seas
Robert Douglas Brownstone

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt
Part of the Evidence Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert D. Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy e-Discovery Seas, 10 Rich. J.L. & Tech 53 (2004).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol10/iss5/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond Journal of Law
and Technology by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume X, Issue 5

Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy
e-Discovery Seas*
Robert Douglas Brownstone**
Cite as: Robert D. Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy e-Discovery
Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53 (2004), at
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i5/article53.pdf.

Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. An Electronic Wave Has Engulfed Civil Litigation
A. Our Digital World
B. Categories of Electronic Information
C. Costs of Retrieving Electronic Information
D. What Litigants Hope to Find: Smoking Guns
III. Different Methods of Production and Review
A. Paper vs. Electronic
B. Inappropriateness of Seeking, or Turning Over, “Everything”
C. Searching
IV. Suggested Solution: Bilateral/Cooperative Approach
From Litigation’s Inception to Conclusion
A. Introduction
B. Overview of Pending Proposed Rule Changes &
Recommendations
C. Policies Favoring/Inducing Cooperation
1. Idealistic Principles
2. Specter of Sanctions
D. Collaborative Vetting Process Needed at all Litigation Stages
1. Rule 26(f) Initial Discovery Conference
2. 30(b)(6) Deposition of Computer System Administrator
3. Throughout the Rest of the Discovery Process:
[Pre-Production] Collaboration on Searching/Vetting
4. Case Studies in Lack of Cooperation (McPeek and Tulip)
V. Conclusion

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

I.

Volume X, Issue 5

Introduction

[1] Seventy years ago, when the world was still paper-based, a famous
lyricist wrote: “Say, it’s only a paper moon [s]ailing over a cardboard
sea. But it wouldn’t be make-believe [i]f you believed in me.”1 Jump to
today’s digital world, and imagine those lines re-written in an e-mail
from a litigator to a client: “Now, underneath each paper moon is a vast
electronic sea. If you plot a realist’s course you’ll cruise e-Discovery.”
In the twentieth century, while civil litigation often wallowed in
discovery disputes, at least paper’s one-dimensional nature provided
several boundaries. The expansive powers of digital media have
shattered those outer limits.2 Thus, on a regular basis, judges, litigators,
clients, and technologists have been forced to explore and test new
methods of fair, thorough, and efficient requests for, and production of,
electronic information.
[2] In days gone by:
• Discoverable information existed primarily or exclusively in
printed hardcopy documents, whose content and history were, for
all intents and purposes, fixed and unalterable.3
• Other than the document’s printed contents and oral
questioning of authors and/or recipients, there was no opportunity
to explore areas such as the timing and content of prior revisions
or the identities of recipients of each such version.
• However large a paper dump ensued, relatively speaking there
were finite sets of discoverable materials4 to be collected,
reviewed and produced, on the one hand, and requested, obtained
and reviewed, on the other hand.5
[3] Yet, in a modern civil lawsuit:
• Discoverable information exists in a wide array of electronic
formats that typically contain much non-printed information,
known as “metadata,”6 namely particulars that are unavailable
when one merely looks at a hardcopy. Metadata mining may be
most fruitful as to e-mail. However, even in commonly and widely
used formats such as Microsoft Word, electronic versions of
documents can reveal many types of underlying information.7
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• Technology has made it possible, and in many instances easy, to
uncover additional potentially helpful facts. Those facts can flesh
out the context of a document, encompassing, for example, timing
and content of prior revisions, identities of recipients of each such
version, and/or identities of prior recipients taken out of a
distribution loop.8
• The size of most every corporate party’s discoverable data set is
very expansive and often infinite.9
[4] Consequentially, in comparison to their predecessors, the twenty-first
century litigator and client are faced with two much more daunting tasks.
Fulfilling the goals of those two tasks entails steering clear of two sea
mines:
• Assessing one’s own potentially huge data set in a thorough,
cost-effective, and pristine-condition-preserving matter, without
being - or seeming to be - obstructionist.
• Extracting, exploring and culling key information from a data
set entirely under the control of one’s opponent, without being - or
seeming to be - on a “drag the ocean” fishing expedition.
[5] Litigators and technologists are still wrestling with how to engage in
electronic discovery while evading those two e-Discovery analogues to
Scylla and Charybdis.10 Judges have been increasingly focused on
developing a growing body of e-Discovery case law, which will ultimately
propound a tried and true process.11 To be efficient and effective, that
process must mandate and enforce cooperation among the litigants as to
search terms and other selection criteria needed to narrow down huge data
sets into manageable subsets.
II.

An Electronic Wave Has Engulfed Civil Litigation
A.

Our Digital World12

[6] In the world in general, 99.99% of information being generated is in
non-printed form.13 E-mail usage and electronic file generation are at
astounding levels.14 While estimates vary, last year one well-respected
scholarly institute, The Sedona Conference,15 opined that “70[%] of
corporate records may be stored in electronic format, and 30[%] of
electronic information is never printed to paper.”16 One expert
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commentator went even further, contending that, in most companies, 90 to
95% of information is stored only in electronic form.17
[7] In turn, broad discovery remains paramount in civil litigation.18 Not
surprisingly, therefore, in the litigation context, the transition to a
predominantly electronic mode has been accelerating at a rapid pace.19
Black letter law is now to the effect that e-information is as susceptible to
discovery rules and principles as paper.20 “[I]f a party chooses an
electronic storage method, the necessity for a retrieval program or method
is an ordinary and foreseeable risk” of commercial litigation.21
B.

Categories of Electronic Information

[8] Hard drives, back-up tapes, storage devices, web server logs,
databases, and “deleted” 22 files are among the numerous formats and
environments that often need to be navigated.23 The best judicial
description of the world of electronic information was propounded last
year by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin in the first of her several landmark
electronic discovery decisions in an employment discrimination case,
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (“Zubulake I”).24 As its threshold issue in
assessing Plaintiff’s motion to compel production, Zubulake I divided the
world of electronic information into two distinct broad categories:
1) “[D]ata that is kept in an accessible format,” broken down into
three sub-categories, “listed in order from most accessible to least
accessible:”
a) “Active, online data,” such as hard drives;
b) “Near-line data,” such as optical disks; and
c) “Offline storage/archives[,] . . . [which] lack[] ‘the
coordinated control of an intelligent disk subsystem,’ and
[consist of], in the lingo, JBOD (‘Just a Bunch of
Disks’).”25
2) “Electronic data [that] is relatively inaccessible,” broken down
into two sub-categories, also ranked in order of accessibility:
a) “Backup tapes;” and
b) “Erased, fragmented or damaged data.”26
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Costs of Retrieving Electronic Information

[9] The significance of the two Zubulake I categories is that they
comprise a framework for coping with the all-important civil discovery
issue of spiraling costs.27 Zubulake I concluded that “in the world of
electronic data, thanks to search engines, any data that is retained in a
machine[-]readable format is typically accessible”28 and thus, if
responsive, must be produced at the expense of the producing party, under
the usual rules of discovery.29 On the other hand, as to inaccessible data
(primarily back-up tapes), Zubulake I held that “[a] court should consider
cost-shifting,” namely requiring the requesting party to shoulder some of
the burden of retrieval costs.30
[10] Back-up tapes trigger a host of fairness and cost issues, and Zubulake
I did its best to fairly assess these issues from the perspective of both
sides. What are back-up tapes, and why do they warrant disparate
treatment?31 As a medium, a back-up tape drive is “[a] device, like a tape
recorder, that reads data from and writes it onto a tape. Tape drives have
data capacities of anywhere from a few hundred kilobytes to several
gigabytes.”32 As a practical matter, companies make daily or weekly
computer system data back-ups,33 to have on hand in case of a catastrophic
system crash. Typically, those back-up tapes are retained for a week, a
month, or a similar period of time, and then are put back into rotation and
recycled.34 Each back-up takes a snapshot of the information on the
computer system at a given time. When subsequent back-up tapes are
made, previously created back-up tapes may be recycled or deleted from
the storage facility.
[11] Although the cost of back-up tapes themselves is relatively small, the
cost of restoring, reviewing, and extracting responsive information from
them can run into tens of thousands of dollars.35 Typically, there is no
directory; thus, only once back-up tapes are “restored” and the contents
indexed can the underlying information be searched, extracted, and/or
manipulated.36 Given that backed up data must not only be indexed but
also decompressed, the restoration process is typically lengthy and
costly.37
[12] As acknowledged by Judge Scheindlin in Zubulake I, the stakes are
thus higher all the way around regarding back-up tapes and other
“relatively inaccessible” data. Consequently, her decision tried to give full
credence to the positions of both requesting and producing parties.
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[13] As to requesting parties, Zubulake I potentially opened a can of
worms by rebuffing a once common objection to discoverability of backup tapes. The accessibility/inaccessibility demarcation eliminated “the
purposes for which the responding party maintains the requested data” as a
factor in a new seven-factor cost-shifting analysis.38 Further, “[w]hether
the data is kept for a business purpose or for disaster recovery does not
affect its accessibility.”39 Zubulake I also carefully protected the rights of
individual Plaintiffs/requestors by generally circumscribing when costs
can be shifted to the requesting party. 40 It did so by ruling that costshifting is appropriate as to restoration of inaccessible data only if its
marginal utility is evinced by a “fact-intensive” review of the results of a
“small sample” restoration.41
[14] As to producing parties, Zubulake I and its follow-up decision,
Zubulake III,42 carefully restricted the extent to which the arena of back-up
tapes could become a bottomless sinkhole for a responding party. In
Zubulake I, the new test was applied to a narrow pertinent set of ninetyfour43 back-up tapes that had previously been identified as responsive.
The court ordered Defendant to produce at its own expense “all responsive
e-mails that exist on its optical disks or on its active servers[,] . . . [and]
responsive e-mails from any five backups [sic] tapes selected by
[Plaintiff].”44 The court also ordered Defendant to “prepare an affidavit
detailing the results of its search, as well as the time and money spent.
After reviewing the contents of the backup tapes and [Defendant]’s
certification, the Court [was to] conduct the appropriate cost-shifting
analysis.”45 In Zubulake III, the court held that the results of the
restoration of the small sample of five tapes warranted shifting to the
requesting party only 25% of restoration costs as to the remaining tapes,
and that all other costs - including the costs of review and production remained with the producing party.46
[15] Implicitly, the Zubulake decisions laid the groundwork for
development of a conceptually sound, pragmatic, and cost-sensitive multistep e-Discovery process, namely a process in which there are incentives
for both sides to cooperate with each other and with the court.
Significantly, the Zubulake opinions did so in the battleground of back-up
tapes, the key factual setting that has instigated many other judges to wade
into the e-Discovery waters.47
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What Litigants Hope to Find: Smoking Guns

[16] An ironic factual aspect of Zubulake was Plaintiff’s packrat-like
tendency to retain many paper copies of e-mails. Plaintiff “produced over
450 pages of relevant e-mails, including e-mails that would have been
responsive to her discovery requests but were never produced by
[Defendant].”48 That fact played a major role in convincing the court to
agree with Plaintiff that Defendant likely had additional pertinent e-mails
in relatively inaccessible electronic form. In particular, Zubulake I
reasoned that Plaintiff “ha[d] already produced a sort of ‘smoking gun’ an e-mail suggesting that she be fired ‘ASAP’ after her EEOC charge was
filed, in part so that she would not be eligible for year-end bonuses.”49
[17] As in Zubulake, in general a requesting party seeks to fulfill the
overall discovery goal of developing evidence to support a claim or
defense. Likewise, it also hopes to uncover the proverbial “smoking gun”
e-mail or other document. As one commentator so aptly pointed out:
Once discovery begins, the chase is on for
smoking gun e-mails, memos admitting
liability, deleted design documents, and
other documents never intended to see the
light of day. . . . It has been proven time and
time again that e-mails are fertile ground for
unearthing damaging documents.
Individuals believe them to be private
communication.50
Based on some widely publicized examples,51 hope springs external as to
unearthing gold nuggets. In one of the fen-phen diet drug litigations, a
Plaintiff’s computer forensics experts uncovered a damaging e-mail
message, which was ultimately leaked to the press.52 The message is
universally claimed to have read: “Do I have to look forward to my waning
years writing checks to fat people with a silly lung problem?”53 Similarly, a
Chevron Corporation subsidiary was apparently induced to settle a sexualharassment claim - in 1995 for $2.2 million - based on unearthed evidence
that included an e-mail containing such jokes as “[twenty-five] reasons beer
is better than women.”54 Generally, such smoking gun e-mails would
remain hidden absent an automated method to retrieve them.
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Different Methods of Production and Review
A.

Paper vs. Electronic

[18] When a very small set of discoverable information exists, it is still
feasible for the parties to physically review printed hard copies of all
documents. In fact, when one’s client’s responsive set and/or the other
side’s produced set is quite small, some feel that paper review is advisable,
even when it is in addition to one or more forms of electronic review.
Why? In those situations, the “serendipity factor” applies, meaning that
the odds are at their highest that paper review may reveal pertinent
information that might be missed in robotic electronic review.55
[19] Even when a lawsuit entails a medium to large e-information
universe, there is not necessarily relevant, let alone earth-shattering,
metadata.56 As has always been the case, the nature and extent of
permissible discovery vary widely, depending on factors such as legal
theories, types of parties, and number of key players. However, in almost
every lawsuit, the sheer volume of potentially responsive e-information
has changed the tools needed just to get through the data set.57
[20] In almost all current civil litigation involving one or more entity
parties, the nature of the beast now mandates that electronic collection,
production, and review predominate, and often constitute the only
effective method.58 An experienced practitioner has propounded a rule of
thumb: “[i]n any matter involving more than [one] gigabyte of data, or
more than 100,000 pages59 of documentation, lawyers should consider e[D]iscovery processes.”60
[21] In many lawsuits, the vastness of the potentially responsive set of
electronic information61 has made it practically impossible for the
litigation team to review hardcopy documents page-by-page. The
Zubulake I court noted that, “‘[b]y comparison [to the time it would take
to search through 100,000 pages of paper], the average office computer
could search all of th[ose] documents for specific words or combinations
of words in minute [sic], perhaps less.’”62 In the author’s own experience,
a complex litigation between two large corporate parties can generate the
equivalent of more than one hundred million pages of discovery
documents, requiring over twenty terabytes of server storage space. 63
Assuming a review rate of one box of paper documents64 per weekday, per
reviewer, a one hundred million page volume corresponds to over thirty
person-years of review for each party. In ecological terms, each side
would require approximately 6,250 trees65 just to print one copy of each of
the documents it produced and of each of the documents it received.
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Inappropriateness of Seeking, or Turning Over, “Everything”

[22] Given the open-ended nature of data storage capacities, electronic era
descendants of the old-fashioned fishing expedition and paper-dump are
fraught with problems for both sides. An overly broad request by the
propounding party will likely be both too intrusive on the responding
party, and indefensible in court if enforcement is sought, thus causing the
requester to lose not only time and money, but also credibility with the
judge.66
[23] An overly broad response by the producing party is also a doubleedged sword. Getting buried in an avalanche of data could render it
impossible for the requester to conduct any meaningful, let alone
complete, review.67 Moreover, if electronic information is produced in its
various respective “native”68 formats, much of it may be impractical (or
impossible) to view, let alone review.69 However, turning over an overly
broad set of data, especially in its native format(s), is not a tenable strategy
for a producing party because it, in effect, “gives away the store” in the
first instance. To the extent the other side has the requisite resources and
is sufficiently tech-savvy to explore the pertinent native files, each such
“native document appears exactly as it appeared to the custodian who
created and maintained the document[;] . . . [thus, one’s opponent would
be able to] see all of the application’s hidden features, such as spreadsheet
formulas, tracked changes and links between documents.”70
C.

Searching

[24] The pivotal “selection criteria”71 issue has been aptly framed by one
Sedona Conference law-and-technology expert, who queried, “is the use
of Selection Criteria a reasonable and reliable way to identify and cull
potentially responsive data from large, co-mingled, general-issue, data
sets?”72 The same expert defined the Sedona Principle Eleven phrase
“selection criteria” as “filtering expressions . . . applied . . . to identify data
items with specific characteristics. Those items . . . that match . . . are
deemed to have ‘hits’ and will be selected, or culled, from the data set for
further processing and/or review.”73
[25] The most effective criteria for winnowing down a large universe of
electronic information could include full-text word searches, time
frame(s), file type(s), and/or key creators or modifiers of documents.74
Though there are deficiencies,75 technology is always changing, such that
the capabilities and capacities of search engines continue to grow.76
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[26] No sophisticated party or attorney seriously contends that an
electronic vetting process is unnecessary. The trickier issue, however, is
whether - and, if so, when - a propounding party gains input into the
responding party’s selection criteria. Responding parties will tend to insist
on the right to “go it alone” in the first instance, while requesting parties
will want to have input ab initio.77
IV.

Suggested Solution: Bilateral/Cooperative Approach
From Litigation’s Inception to Conclusion
A.

Introduction

[27] As recognized by The Sedona Principles, “dialogue between litigants
is a prerequisite to resolving (or avoiding) potentially costly and disruptive
electronic discovery disputes.”78 The prospect of such bilateral
cooperation becomes real rather than a pipe dream as long as one accepts
the following premises and presumptions:
• Many broad generalizations cannot be applicable to every
litigation. A lawsuit - however unique its facts and legal theories is always intrinsically a dispute between parties whose counsel are
hired to vigorously advocate, which includes using strategy.79
• The Zubulake marginal utility approach will be used to prevent
fishing expeditions into inaccessible data such as back-up tapes,
and the court will induce the parties to cooperate on search criteria
at all three phases of the Zubulake framework.80
• When an individual is litigating against a company, the trial
judge will strive to ensure that justice is served.81
• Where necessary to protect privileged material,82 trade secrets
and the like, the trial judge will work with the parties to establish
protocols for data gathering and review, including, perhaps,
appointing a neutral computer expert.83
• All concerned, including computer experts, will employ the best
technology practices to ensure that original electronic information
is not manipulated and that the integrity of working copies thereof
is preserved.84
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[28] With those principles accepted as starting points, it is time to touch
on the most recent proposed standards and rules aiming for a cooperative
e-Discovery process.
B.

Overview of Pending Proposed Rule Changes &
Recommendations

[29] The same long-held discovery law principles apply to electronic
information.85 However, judicial interpretation of those principles in the
variegated factual contexts wrought by technological advances has been
slow. Some of that slowness is due to judges’ predilection to adhere to
their traditional role of “develop[ing] principles on a case-by-case basis
from the ground up.”86 As in other contexts, there are four reasons why
we will all get very old if we wait for the adjudicative process to finish
that task. First, “[m]ost reported discovery cases come from trial courts
and have little precedential value.”87 Second, there is generally very little
guidance from courts of appeals, because few discovery cases get
appealed.88 Third, when such cases are appealed, the level of appellate
review is deferential, leaving most discovery determinations within the
discretion of the trial judge.89 Fourth, the reported decisions tend to
involve obstructionist conduct at the most egregious end of the spectrum,
90
thus arguably offering insufficient guidance to those acting in a
mainstream manner.
[30] There are several current movements to establish new standards that
could provide some much-needed guidance in the e-Discovery arena. At
the federal level, the Discovery Subcommittee of the United States
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (FRCP Committee) is assessing
whether the nuances of electronic information warrant proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).91 Many
question whether the “three-to[-]four-year process” endemic to revising
the FRCP92 can possibly keep up with technological advances.93 Even the
FRCP Committee itself has acknowledged a “legitimate concern that any
definition we fix upon presently could be rendered meaningless by
changes in five or ten years. The goal of this effort is to try to use terms
that anticipate technological developments and would be sufficiently
flexible to be of use once those occur.”94
[31] Nonetheless, the current draft of the proposed FRCP changes does
tackle a number of key technology topics, such as:
• contemplating adding a provision to FRCP 34(1)(A) - as to
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scope of discovery - that might encompass metadata;95
• amending FRCP 34(b)(1)(B) - as to “form of the request” - to
include that “[t]he request may specify the form in which
electronically-stored data are to be produced,”96 ostensibly
including metadata; and
• considering authorizing a “quick peek” - in other words, “initial
examination” - procedure in FRCP 34(b)(2)(E), whereby a party
would preliminarily turn over electronic information to its
adversary without waiving any privilege objections.97
Three of the Sedona Conference’s eleven Principles - Three, Six
and Eleven - address aspects of narrowing the scope of e-Discovery.
Principle Three provides that “[p]arties should confer early in discovery
regarding the preservation and production of electronic data and
documents when these matters are at issue in the litigation and seek to
agree on the scope of each party’s rights and responsibilities.”98 Principle
Six, in essence, advises against standard procedures covering “the role of
forensic-style data retrieval and analysis procedures in civil discovery.”99
In short, Principle Six warns that “the precise methods, or choice of
vendor or consultant, should not be dictated by the court.”100
[32] Sedona Principle Eleven particularly addresses “data sampling,
searching, or the use of selection criteria.”101 Though that Principle
authorizes the responding party’s harvesting of its own data set, it also
prescribes that this culling be conducted in the spirit of fulfilling the “good
faith obligation to preserve and produce potentially responsive electronic
data and documents.”102 And, by way of an important qualification, the
corresponding Observation “recommend[s], however, that methodology be
discussed by the parties before the searches begin, most likely at the Rule
26(f) conference. This recommendation follows Principle [Three] and
might serve to diffuse potential disputes, avoiding unnecessary duplication
and costs.”103
[33] Also weighing in is the Task Force on Electronic Discovery of the
Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association (ABA), which has
circulated for public comment a draft set of proposed amendments to the
ABA’s Civil Discovery Standards.104 Many of that task force’s proposals
espouse ways that the parties can vet large sets of electronic information
so as to more efficiently and fairly tackle huge amounts of data.105
Moreover, on the “quick peek” issue, several of the ABA Standards’ other

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume X, Issue 5

proposals suggest three stipulated methods by which parties could produce
large data sets likely containing some potentially privileged material
without actually waiving privilege.106
[34] The aptness of the recommendations of these various bodies is
buttressed by the case studies in inefficiency discussed in Part IV(D)(4)
below.
C.

Policies Favoring/Inducing Cooperation

[35] In addition to the incentive to join forces in attempting to
conquer the overwhelming amounts of data discussed in Part II(A)
above, there are other factors militating in favor of cooperation.
1.

Idealistic Principles

[36] Attorneys are expected to cooperate during the discovery
process. First, professional responsibility requires attorneys to
offer one another at least some level of cooperation.107 Second, in
theory, “information contained in electronic records can help the
company’s position in a legal proceeding just as easily as it can be
harmful.”108 As a result, a thorough search for electronic evidence
is in the company’s best interest. The author’s experience as a
litigator has generally borne out that theory. Typically a dispute
that proceeds into a lengthy discovery phase entails many facts that
are not cut and dry and are thus susceptible to varying
interpretations and depictions. As a result, it tends to be better for
all sides to learn the full range of direct and circumstantial
evidence that truly exists for claim building, defense building, and
potential settlement assessment purposes.
2.

Specter of Sanctions

[37] Even putting aside the carrot of the idealistic principles of
ethics and truth-seeking, there is a new stick. Increasingly, techsavvy judges have become much tougher on parties who, ostrichlike, refuse to cooperate in electronic discovery.109 Judges have
begun to lose their patience with recalcitrant parties, both
discovery requesters (propounders) and discovery responders
(producers). While the vast majority of reported e-Discovery
decisions focus on wayward producers, several recent appellate
decisions have restrained propounders by preventing them from
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making vague requests and gaining unfettered access to an
opponent’s electronic information. 110
[38] “‘[T]hat parties need to work together from the beginning, conferring
with each other as often as necessary so that appropriate material is
produced at reasonable times’” is the take-away from a relatively recent
reversal of a Plaintiff’s jury verdict.111 The Second Circuit’s opinion in
Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp. reinforces the
judicial trend to scrutinize companies’ protestations that they cannot
recover data stored on back-up tapes.112 There, the appellate court found
that the trial court had not adequately dissected Plaintiff’s months of
protestations concerning purported technical difficulties in recovering emails from the critical time period at issue. Those contentions, which
continued past the start of trial, were rendered quite suspicious by
Defendant’s consultant’s ability to recover 950,000 e-mails from the
pertinent time period in four days.113
[39] The range of sanctions for a producing party who will not cooperate
or otherwise meet its discovery obligations is very broad, including
“monetary penalties (such as attorney fees, costs and/or pay-for-proof
sanctions), exclusion of evidence; adverse inference jury instructions, and,
in an appropriately extreme case, even a dismissal or default judgment.”114
In Residential Funding Corp., the Second Circuit analyzed the requisite
“culpable state of mind” to encompass not only “bad faith” or “gross
negligence,” but also ordinary negligence.115 A few months later, a
Southern District of New York judge went even farther in Metropolitan
Opera Ass’n v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees
International Union.116 There, the misconduct was so extreme117 that
Judge Loretta A. Preska granted “Plaintiff’s motion for [final] judgment as
to liability against [D]efendants and for . . . attorneys’ fees necessitated by
the discovery abuse[s] by [D]efendants and their counsel.”118
Metropolitan Opera Ass’n relied on FRCP 37,119 28 U.S.C. § 1927,120 and
a court’s inherent power to sanction as the justifications for the lawsuit’s
ultimate “result [being] driven by discovery abuse,” rather than by
resolution “on the merits.”121
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Collaborative Vetting Process Needed at all Litigation
Stages122
1.

Rule 26(f) Initial Discovery Conference

[40] An early dialogue among the parties as to the logistics of electronic
discovery is likely necessary to assure compliance with FRCP 26(f),123
especially in an action in which electronic information is likely to be
significant.124 Rule 26(f) provides in pertinent part that “the parties must,
as soon as practicable and in any event at least [twenty-one] days before a
scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is due under [FRCP]
16(b), confer . . . to develop a proposed discovery plan.” As one federal
district court judge pointed out in 2002:
In the electronic age, this [Rule 26(f)] meet
and confer should include a discussion [of]
whether each side possesses information in
electronic form, whether they intend to
produce such material, whether each other’s
software is compatible, whether there exists
any privilege issue requiring redaction, and
how to allocate costs involved with each of
the foregoing.125
[41] The recent proposals have all focused on beefing up the e-Discovery
aspect of the Rule 26 conference.126 Consistent with Sedona Principle
Three, e-Discovery issues such as selection criteria should be covered in
the course of satisfying the FRCP 26(f) meet and confer obligation as well
as in initial disclosures.127 ABA Draft Standard 31(a)(i)-(xiii) mandates
that “the initial discovery conference” address all e-Discovery,
encompassing thirteen sub-topics such as “subject matter,” “time period,”
likely sources, “accessibility of the potentially responsive data,” and “the
potentially responsive data” and its likely “platforms.”128 Likewise, a draft
proposed addition to FRCP 26(f) would require the parties to address
electronic discovery issues and related waiver-of-privilege concerns at the
conference.129 A proposed note to accompany that new provision would
specifically reference “search protocol” as a discussion topic.130
2.

30(b)(6) Deposition of Computer System Administrator

[42] Assuming that the location and/or amount of an opponent’s computer
data are important and have only been preliminarily delineated in the

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume X, Issue 5

initial discovery conference and in initial disclosures, there is a logical
next step, in which both parties should engage openly and in good faith.
Under FRCP 30(b)(6),131 a party should notice the deposition(s) of one or
more person(s) with knowledge, such as the Information Technology (IT)
Director. The federal magistrate who decided McPeek I and McPeek II
has stated for attribution that “‘[t]he first deposition you take in any case
should be the system administrator of your opponent.’”132 In addition,
ABA Draft Standard 31(a)(iv) contemplates as much by providing for the
identification of one or more IT persons with knowledge at the initial
discovery conference.133
[43] Questions might cover issues such as “hardware, software, software
applications, [system] back-ups, e-mail and voicemail administration.”134
Many outlines of sample questions for IT 30(b)(6) depositions and for
other types of e-Discovery questions (for depositions as well as
interrogatories and requests for production) are readily available on the
web.135
3.

Throughout the Rest of the Discovery Process:
[Pre-Production] Collaboration on Searching/Vetting

[44] Each of the three pending sets of recommendations discussed in Part
IV(B) above encourages that, in “meet and confer” conferences throughout
a lawsuit, the parties focus on reaching agreements as to winnowing
criteria.136 Regardless of the specific standards that will be implemented
by future rules, as a practical matter, the sooner in discovery that the
parties cooperate on the searching/culling/vetting process, the better.
Early collaboration gives the parties the best odds of avoiding return
tickets to court to repeatedly revisit the same issues.
[45] Requesting parties tend to push for opportunities for early input,
contending that a responding party’s inherent bias will infect the integrity
of unilateral choices regarding search criteria. Propounders can raise a
number of legitimate concerns about ceding to the responding party the
exclusive right to identify the discoverable universe. First, there are the
dual specters of under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness. Second,
there is often an inequality of information, meaning that the requesting
party may know nothing, or next to nothing, about the format, size or
content of the responding party’s data’s. This concern is arguably
heightened in fraud, employment discrimination, intellectual property
infringement, and trade secret usage cases. Third, though search engines
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have gotten more and more advanced, the tools chosen by a responding
party may have deficiencies.137
[46] If producing parties objectively chose broad, “defensible” search
criteria from the get-go, then requesting parties would not keep clamoring
for early input into the selection process.138 Aside from zealous advocacy,
producing parties can point to legitimate reasons for their own right to cull
in the first instance, such as:
•

protection of privileged and confidential materials;

•

maintenance of discovery’s scope within appropriate legal
boundaries; and

•

utilization of search criteria to cull responsive electronic
information is an antidote for the futility of producing a data
set too large to be physically reviewed.139

In short, the producing party will contend that, if it is proceeding in good
faith under the standards of Sedona Principles Three, Six and Eleven, its
own vetting process will be a remedy for, instead of an enabler of,
obfuscation.
[47] Whatever happens initially, at some subsequent point in discovery, a
producing party is likely to acknowledge the inevitable futility of utter
unilateralism; then, it thus “may want to consider entering into discussions
with the opposing party regarding specific selection criteria to be used in
subsequent searches of the electronic data set. While this is not always
possible or advantageous, there are situations when such a dialogue can
eliminate needless disputes . . . .”140 A bilateral/multi-lateral process does
not just aid the propounding party. The longer the producing party waits
to accept the inexorable need for a discourse, the less credibility141 that
party will have in its future discussions with the other side and with the
court. In addition, a joint plan puts fair pressure on the requestor to be
more focused and particular from the outset. That pressure is, and should
be, even greater as to inaccessible data such as back-up tapes.
Significantly, the first Zubulake factor (comprising half of the marginal
utility analysis) is “the extent to which the request is specifically tailored
to discover relevant information.”142 But the trade-off is that a requesting
party that has done its homework can get at the information it needs
without going on a fishing expedition.
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Case Studies in Lack of Cooperation (McPeek and Tulip)

[48] In the hearing resulting in the Zubulake III opinion, the parties
returned to court within only two months, pursuant to the court’s wellthought out, but brand new, three-step process in which “small sampling”
review had been the second step. However, in some prior cases, without
the guidance of the Zubulake framework, a similar process was very
prolonged due to contentiousness between the parties.
[49] In the first round of the McPeek retaliation case (McPeek I), the court
ordered partial restoration of back-up tapes, but only to the extent that
those tapes contained e-mails to and from Plaintiff’s supervisor during the
key one year period.143 Almost a year and a half later, after the search and
resultant review were complete, the parties returned to court. The two
sides vehemently disagreed in their characterizations of the results. On the
one hand, Plaintiff contended that the search had “produced useful,
relevant information that justifie[d] a second search of backup tapes for
certain periods . . . [that would] not be that difficult or expensive given
what the first search accomplished.”144 On the other hand, Defendant
“insist[ed] that the first search only produced [cumulative] documents . . .
[and] a second search would be expensive and time consuming.”145 The
magistrate judge assessed the likelihood that the back-up tapes would
contain word processing documents and/or e-mail messages that would
produce relevant information. Then, he denied a request for additional
searches as to three of the four key people at issue, but granted the request
as to the fourth person.146
[50] Impasses like the one in McPeek can lead to delay as well as
expenditures of much time and money on repetitive scope-of-discovery
issues. Such stalemates are even more vexatious when the responding
party’s unwillingness to cooperate is obstructionist to the degree that the
court has to get involved and order cooperation on search parameters.147 A
classic example is Tulip Computers International B.V. v. Dell Computer
Corp.,148 a PC components patent infringement case that settled at the trial
stage late last summer, after years of discovery skirmishes. There were
five discovery problem areas, many aspects of which surfaced relatively
early in the litigation.
[51] In Tulip Computers, for months after receiving Plaintiffs’ requests
for production (RFP’s), Defendant Dell contended that there was no way
to search the pertinent electronic information. It took until nine months
after service of the RFP’s for Dell to disclose that its off-site storage
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contained 44,000 boxes of documents and many back-up tapes.149 Dell
ultimately offered access to some electronic documents kept in the
ordinary course of business in its “data warehouse.”150 As to those data
warehouse documents, Dell initially imposed many restrictions (including
search/data fields), but then softened its stance, so that Plaintiffs and its eDiscovery consultant Ontrack could adequately search for, and extract, the
sought-after information.151
[52] An irresolvable dispute lingered as to e-mails that Dell contended
could never be responsive. The court granted Plaintiffs’ customized
request that Dell make its senior executives’ e-mail records available to
Plaintiffs after having an opportunity to address privilege and
confidentiality concerns. 152 As part of the rationale for allowing Plaintiffs
to ascertain for themselves the accuracy of Dell’s representations that all
responsive documents had been produced, the court cited Dell’s history of
obfuscations and stonewalling.153
[53] Plaintiffs’ proposed procedure—including collaboration on
searching—was deemed “fair, efficient, and reasonable.”154 Defendant
had to “provide the e-mails from the hard disks of the identified executives
in electronic form to [Plaintiffs’ consultant,]” who would “search the emails based on an agreed upon list of search terms.”155 Plaintiff was
directed to give Defendant a list of e-mails containing those terms, but was
not to read the e-mails until Defendant had an opportunity to review them
to ensure that privilege and confidentiality concerns were not
compromised.156 After some more months of discovery disputes, the case
stumbled along toward its ultimate eve-of-trial settlement.157
V.

Conclusion

[54] Litigants are advised to cooperate early and often in the battle against
the common enemy, a huge fluid body of electronic information.
Proposed rule changes and recent decisions dot the horizon, providing
buoys and beacons to steer litigants and litigators on their journey. Yet, in
the final analysis, these distant guides are insufficient to assist the parties
in reaching their final destination expeditiously and safely. The nature of
discovery and the complexities of electronic information militate in favor
of bilateral programming of the figurative Global Positioning System.
Absent cooperation in seeking a finite set of mutually agreeable
destinations, the parties are likely to end up adrift at sea together. 158 They
may even end up in a small sinking skiff, roaming an unbounded ocean,
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bailing water in a futile attempt to avoid being swept under by “the great
shroud of the [electronic] sea.”159
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Back-up tapes are by their nature indiscriminate; “[t]hey capture all information at a
given time and from a given server but do not catalogue it by subject matter.” McPeek v.
Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001) [hereinafter McPeek I]. A “practical
shortcoming[] [is that] unlike the data on a hard drive or optical disc, the information on
[a back-up tape] is arranged in linear form. [The] tape has to be wound backward and
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forward to retrieve or record data, making it slower in operation.” Austen, supra note 33,
at G8.
37
For example, “[o]nce e-mails have been stored onto backup tapes, the restoration
process is lengthy.” Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 314. Moreover, “[b]ackup tapes also
typically employ some sort of data compression, permitting more data to be stored on
each tape, but also making restoration more time-consuming and expensive, especially
given the lack of uniform standard governing data compression.” Id. at 319.
38
Id. at 316. Under the new approach, step one is to identify inaccessible data, step two
is to produce a small sample of inaccessible data for review, and step three is to:
conduct[] [a] cost-shifting analysis, [in which] the
following factors should be considered, weighted
more-or-less in the following order:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically
tailored to discover relevant information;
2. The availability of such information from other
sources;
3. The total cost of production, compared to the
amount in controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the
resources available to each party;
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs
and its incentive to do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation; and
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information.
Id. at 324. As to the sampling approach, “[l]itigants should consider the use of sampling
techniques when appropriate to narrow the burden of searching voluminous electronic
data for relevant information.” Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 39-40 cmt. 11.b.
39
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321. This holding is a more particular application of the
broad policy increasingly espoused by courts over the past few years that, “[u]pon
installing a data storage system, it must be assumed that at some point in the future one
may need to retrieve the information previously stored.” Kaufman v. Kinko’s, Inc., No.
CIV.A.18894-NC, 2002 WL 32123851, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2002). “‘[I]f a party
chooses an electronic storage method, the necessity for a retrieval program or method is
an ordinary and foreseeable risk’” of doing business, and the inconvenience and cost of
retrieval is insufficient to defeat a good faith discovery request. Id. at *2 n.2 (quoting In
re Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust Litig., No. 94-C-897, 1995 WL 360526, *2
(N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995). Note, though, that the proposed new Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(h)(2), provides in part that “[i]n responding to discovery requests, a party
need not include electronically-stored data created only for disaster-recovery purposes.”
Memorandum from Professor Rick Marcus, to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
33, available at http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules/marcus091503a.pdf
(Sept. 15, 2003).
40
The Zubulake I court criticized prior decisions for having automatically engaged in
cost-shifting analysis as a knee-jerk reaction, based on a faulty “assum[ption] that an
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undue burden or expense may arise simply because electronic evidence is involved.” Id.
at 318. As a matter of policy, Zubulake I noted that “cost-shifting may effectively end
discovery, especially when private parties are engaged in litigation with large
corporations. As large companies increasingly move to entirely paper-free environments,
the frequent use of cost-shifting will have the effect of crippling discovery in
discrimination and retaliation cases.” Id. at 317-18.
41
Id. at 324.
42
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter
Zubulake III].
43
It later turned out that there were only seventy-seven responsive tapes. Id. at 282.
44
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324 (emphasis added).
45
Id.
46
Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 291. The Zubulake III court explained that “[t]he more
likely it is that the backup tape contains information that is relevant to a claim or defense,
the fairer it is that the [responding party] search at its own expense.” Id. at 284.
Zubulake III also held that, “[a]s a general rule, where cost-shifting is appropriate, only
the costs of restoration and searching should be shifted. . . . However, the responding
party should always bear the cost of reviewing and producing electronic data once it has
been converted to an accessible form.” Id. at 290.
47
See, e.g., supra Part IV(D)(4) (discussing Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer
Corp., No. 00-981-RRM, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2002); McPeek
v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33 (D.D.C. 2003) [hereinafter McPeek II]; McPeek I, 202 F.R.D.
31 (D.D.C. 2001)).
48
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317.
49
Id. at 312 n.8.
50
J. Robert Keena, E-Discovery: Unearthing Documents Byte by Byte, BENCH & B. OF
MINN. (Minn. State Bar, Minneapolis, Minn.), Mar. 2, 2002,
http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2002/mar02/ediscovery.htm.
51
The following “real” (though seemingly apocryphal) examples were compiled in an
article by David S. Bennahum:
[•] Yes I know we shipped 100 barrels of [deleted], but on our
end, steps have been taken to ensure that no record exists.
Therefore it doesn’t exist. If you know what I mean. Remember,
you owe me a golf game next time I’m in town.
[•] Did you see what Dr. [deleted] did today? If that patient
survives it will be a miracle.
David S. Bennahum, Daemon Seed: Old Email Never Dies, WIRED 7.05,
May 1999, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/7.05/email_pr.html (redactions appear
in the original article). See generally supra notes 72-74 and accompanying
text (discussing John Jessen, whose war stories formed the basis of
Bennahum’s article).
52
Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rep. 189, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 15, 1999).
53
Keena, supra note 50; Kristin M. Nimsger, Same Game, New Rules: E-discovery Adds
Complexity to Protecting Clients and Disadvantaging Opponents, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 25,
2002, available at http://www.law.com/special/supplement/e_discovery/same_game.html
(last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
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Ann Carrns, Prying Times: Those Bawdy E-Mails Were Good for a Laugh – Until the
Ax Fell, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2000, at A1 (“[I]n harassment suits[,] [o]ne or two explicit
e-mail messages typically aren’t enough . . . to prove that a workplace environment was
hostile. But such e-mail can bolster other damaging evidence.”).
55
Where appropriate, especially in a now rare small case, discovery requests “should
[not] only concentrate on data in its electronic form. . . . Hard copies may often provide
invaluable information. For example, handwritten notes may be written directly on a
printout of a document . . . .” Dale M. Cendali et al., Electronic Discovery, in 2 SEVENTH
ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 615, 626 (Practising Law Institute 2003).
56
“The term meta data has taken on an unfortunate negative connotation for many legal
professionals. In reality, meta data very rarely reveals a ‘smoking gun’ document or
otherwise harms a litigant’s case.” Davey, supra note 6, at 5.
57
Electronic Discovery: New Challenges, New Opportunities, supra note 19, at 1.
58
Some litigators may still be resisting transitioning to electronic discovery tools. See,
e.g., Robert D. Brownstone, How to Sway Litigators to Embrace the Electronic Realm, 1
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: DISCOVERY 38 (2004) (suggesting ways to shepherd luddite-like
litigators into the modern era).
59
Depending on the nature of the medium and/or the file-type, the calculation of pages
per gigabyte varies, ranging from approximately 15,000 to around 675,000. Applied
Discovery, How Many Pages in a Gigabyte?, at
http://www.applieddiscovery.com/clientResources/techTips1.asp (last visited Mar. 10,hh
2004). While it is true that “[d]ifferent document types will generate very different
numbers of pages per document and per gigabyte[,] . . . for a given document type, the
average number of pages produced as compared to the size consumed by the original
documents stays consistent.” Id.
60
Antonucci, supra note 16, at 2. Some of the many providers of
collecting/searching/producing services and/or computer forensics services are: Applied
Discovery, at http://www.applieddiscovery.com/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2004);
Foundstone, at http://www.foundstone.com/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2004); Guidance
Software, at http://www.guidancesoftware.com/services/index.shtm (last visited Mar. 10,
2003); Kroll Ontrack, at http://www.krollontrack.com/eEvidence (last visited Mar. 10,
2004); New Technologies, Inc., at http://www.forensics-intl.com/ (last updated Dec. 22,
2003); and Steelpoint, at http://www.steelpoint.com/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
61
Virginia R. Llewellyn, Electronic Discovery Preparedness – The Secret to Success,
THE METRO. CORP. COUNS. (The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Mountainside, N.J.),
Dec. 2003, at 40 (“Knowledge of data storage systems benefits the company’s position
offensively as well, allowing outside counsel to effectively negotiate discovery
parameters and challenge unduly burdensome requests.”). For a discussion of the extent
to which a company may systematically reduce the amount of electronic information it
retains, see Fenwick, supra note 17, at 4; Cendali et al., supra note 55, at 642. For a
discussion of the preservation obligation, see generally Brownstone, supra note 6, §
II(A), at 2-13.
62
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Scheindlin, J.) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal
Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 364 (2000)).
63
In modern litigation, such a data universe typically consists primarily of pure electronic
files, plus some image files created by scanning and/or OCR’ing hardcopy documents
that were only found in paper form.
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Lazar, supra note 23, at 14 (defining a “box” as an “average banker’s box [that] holds
2,500 sheets of paper, and one page of information on average equals [twenty] kilobytes
(.02 megabytes)”). Note that .02 is a conservative page-to-data size conversion factor,
because data-intensive e-mails and/or spreadsheets may have factors of .01 or .005
megabytes. See id.
65
DocFinity, Saving the Environment One Tree at a Time; The Environmental Impact of
Electronic Document Management, DOCUMENT MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2002, available at
http://www.dptmag.com/editorial2.asp?ID=152 (last visited Apr. 2, 2004) (estimating
that one tree is roughly equivalent to 8,000 pages) (citing CLAUDIA THOMPSON,
RECYCLED PAPERS: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE (MIT Press 1992)).
66
See, e.g., Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 00-981-RRM, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2002) (demonstrating the consequences of a
defendant’s ongoing stonewalling); see also discussion supra Part IV(D)(4).
67
Tom McCann, Electronic Discovery Becomes Hot Topic in Legal Tech, CHI. LAW.,
Oct. 2003, at 43 (“The last thing you want . . . is to be overwhelmed by a deluge of data.
Make specified searches to create a subset of data, sufficiently small so that both sides
have time to review it. Some opposing counsel are reluctant . . . . But I’ve always been
successful at negotiating a reasonable narrowing of the data.”).
68
Nimsger & Lange, supra note 5 (“Native data refers to documents still in the original
file format in which they were created (i.e., in the specific software applications used to
create each individual document).”).
69
Id. (discussing the various disadvantages and advantages of native review).
70
Id. “In most cases, the limitations associated with native file review - potential for
spoliation, searching limitations and inability to redact - is driving a choice of review
method toward data conversion [plus] online repository review.” Id. An even earlier
hurdle may be that those same limitations restrict the producing party’s counsel’s preproduction review of native documents. See, e.g., Jones v. Goord, No. 95-CIV-8026,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2002) (demonstrating how practical
considerations seemed to hamstring a judge who might otherwise have required
Defendant to produce “data in electronic, manipulable form [to] facilitate expert
analysis”). Goord is discussed in detail in Brownstone, supra note 6, § II(D)(3), at 30-31.
71
Sedona Principles, supra note 3, § 11, at 39.
72
John Jessen, Electronic Discovery Issue #1 at 1 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology).
73
Id. at 2.
74
See id. at 4.
75
In the author’s experience, legal software initially developed before the recent
electronic data explosion has not successfully reinvented itself to accommodate vast eDiscovery data sets. To fill the void, many new vendors have sprung up, purporting to
offer vehicles that successfully navigate e-Discovery. Few providers offer services that
even purport to be powerful enough to tackle enormous data sets. Ostensibly, “[a]
handful of companies, such as startup Fios, Applied Discovery, and Kroll OnTrack . . .
offer specific services . . . that catalog and categorize massive numbers of files.” Alex
Salkever, A Supercharged Search Engine for Lawyers, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, June 25,
2003, available at
http://www.businessweek.com:/print/technology/content/jun2003/tc20030625_5288_tc04
7.htm?tc In those few putatively more robust applications, “[f]iles are organized by type,
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date, keyword, and other criteria that provide far more capability to search for complex
terms and patterns than on the average Web search engine.” Id.
76
See, e.g., Cendali et al., supra note 55, at 626 (detailing the
capabilities of various search software). See generally Joan Feldman,
Effective Data Searches, Computer Forensics Inc., at
http://www.forensics.com/pdf/Effective_Data_Searches.pdf (last
visited Apr. 1, 2004).
77
For an excellent summary of some of the pros and cons on this issue, see Jessen, supra
note 72, at 2.
78
Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at iv. The Sedona Principles also recognized that
“[e]ach . . . aspect[] of discovery should be considered in light of the nature of the
litigation and the amount in controversy, as well as the cost, burden, and disruption to
parties’ operations.” Id.
79
Cf. id. (“Electronic discovery is a tool to help resolve a dispute and should not be
viewed as a strategic weapon to coerce unjust, delayed, or expensive results.”).
80
If inaccessible data is worthy of discovery, then - once it “has been converted to an
accessible form” - it should be treated just like accessible data for all e-Discovery
purposes. Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Restoration . . . is the act
of making inaccessible material accessible. That ‘special purpose’ or ‘extraordinary step’
should be the subject of cost-shifting. . . . However, [post-conversion,] the responding
party should always bear the cost of reviewing and producing electronic data.”).
81
Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 8 n.12 (“[E-Discovery] disputes are most likely to
arise and require court intervention when the burdens of preservation and production are
disproportionate among the litigants . . . .”). The Zubulake approach intentionally sought
to narrow the circumstances in which a corporate producing party can shift costs onto an
individual requesting party. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). On
the other side of the coin, to avoid fishing expeditions by individuals, the Zubulake
approach makes a requesting party clear a marginal utility hurdle before it can get at
relatively inaccessible data. Id. at 323.
82
In late 2003, an appellate decision denied “unlimited, direct access to [Defendant]’s
databases” because the trial “court [had] established no protocols for the search . . . [and]
did not even designate search terms to restrict the search.” In re Ford Motor Co., 345
F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (vacating discovery order). One commentator has
described the Ford holding as interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 to “allow
the responding party to search its own records to produce the required, relevant data . . .
[but] not give the requesting party the right to conduct the actual search.” Blouin, supra
note 4.
83
For a discussion of the apparent judicial tendency to appoint a neutral expert to copy
hard drives and to attempt to recover deleted data, see Brownstone, supra note 6, § II(C),
at 25-27; Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. MySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (appointing neutral expert to recover “deleted” files from computers, including
home computers, used by Defendant’s employees), supplemented by No. IP.99-1195-C
H/G, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8953 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 2000); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999), aff'd in part & rev’d in part on other
grounds, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (appointing neutral expert to copy Defendant’s
personal computer hard drive, due to evidence of Defendant’s deletion of e-mails
responsive to Plaintiff’s document production request and likelihood of recovery).
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See, e.g., Christopher D. Wall & Michele C. S. Lange, Electronic Discovery: Recent
Developments, WASH. LAW., Mar. 2003,
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/washington_lawyer/march_2003/electronic.cfm (last
visited Mar. 16, 2004) ( “Simply booting a computer can possibly destroy valuable
metadata . . . that could be relevant in a lawsuit”) (citing Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook
Borders. Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652-54 (D. Minn. 2002)).
85
Llewellyn, supra note 61, at 40 (“The basic legal framework for electronic discovery is
the same as that for paper documents, with the rules of discovery providing expansive
access to an opposing party’s electronic data.”).
86
Electronic Evidence – A Big Issue With No Easy Solutions, THE METRO. CORP. COUNS.
(The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Mountainside, N.J.), Dec. 2003, at 48 (editor’s
interview with BASF Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Thomas Y. Allman)
[hereinafter Allman].
87
Practitioner Reacts to 2nd Circuit Electronic Discovery Decision, FED. DISCOVERY
NEWS, Dec. 16, 2002 (quoting Alan Blakely, chair of Federal Bar Association’s Federal
Litigation Section).
88
Allman, supra note 86, at 48. But see Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin.
Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002).
89
See, e.g., Wright v. AmSouth Bancorp., 320 F.3d 1198, 1205 (11th Cir. 2003)
(affirming denial of discovery after “review[ing] district court’s rulings on discovery
issues for an abuse of discretion”).
90
See, e.g., Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int’l
Union,, 212 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
91
The interim website for the pertinent materials can be found at Ken Withers, Discovery
Subcommittee Letter on Electronic Discovery and Responses, at
http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
92
Robert A. Clifford, Court Addresses Electronic Discovery, CHI. LAW., July 2003, at 22
(“[2002’s] survey on electronic discovery [went out] to 150 lawyers, bar organizations
and technical people seeking input on whether federal rules are adequate to ensure that
discovery is predictable.”).
93
Among the doubters is BASF General Counsel Thomas Y. Allman, interviewed in
Electronic Evidence – A Big Issue with No Easy Solutions, supra note 87, at 48.
“Drafting rules in this area is difficult. If you make them too specific, the pace of
technological development may make the rules obsolete in a short time. On the other
hand, if you make them too general, they are not really adding to the body of law.” Id.
94
Marcus, supra note 39, at 5.
95
Id. at 11-12. The proposed amendment tentatively states, intentionally vaguely, that
“for electronically-stored data,” requests for production may cover “all data stored or
maintained on that document {if the court so orders for good cause}.” Id. at 11. Specific
references to metadata and “embedded data” are in the proposed Committee Note
regarding this addition. Marcus, supra note 39, at 12. The committee has not yet reached
a consensus on this issue, especially in the context of inaccessible data. See id. at 12.
96
Id. at 14.
97
Id. at 24-30 (discussing the pros and cons of alternative provisions in this regard).
98
Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 16; see also John L. Carroll, Observations on the
“Sedona Principles,” at 4, at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/miscFiles/carroll (last
visited Mar. 3, 2004) (“In the field of electronic discovery, we believe this principle
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states the central lesson of the current case law, the commentary in the legal press, and
the discussions in rulemaking circles.”).
99
Carroll, supra note 98, at 5. Principle Six appears at first glance to aid responders, in
that it provides that “[r]esponding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures,
methodologies and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own
electronic data and documents.” Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 27. However, the
corresponding “Observation” contains a significant qualifying “corollary,” namely that
“responding parties are responsible for the reasonably anticipated consequences of their
choices. The corollary applies if a party has a history of discovery sanctions or if it has
no reliable electronic document management procedures.” Carroll, supra note 98, at 5.
Plus, even Sedona Principle Six itself cites a case where preservation efforts were grossly
insufficient. See Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., No. 98-C-7482, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16900, at *13-14 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000) (criticizing parties for failure to
communicate or to gain “complete mastery of what types of documents were generated
by [Defendant] in the ordinary course of business, how they were used, or their
significance”).
100
Carroll, supra note 98, at 5.
101
Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 39.
102
Id. (emphasis added).
103
Carroll, supra note 98, at 8 (emphasis added).
104
The proposed e-Discovery-related amendments are posted along with a cover letter
seeking comments. See Task Force on Electronic Discovery, American Bar Association
Section of Litigation, November 2003 Draft Amendments to Electronic Discovery
Standards, at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/electronic/document.pdf (Nov.
17, 2003) [hereinafter ABA Draft Amendments]. The highlights of the proposed changes
are summarized by a Co-Chair of the Task Force. See Gregory P. Joseph, Electronic
Discovery, 26 NAT’L L.J 19 (Nov. 24, 2003).
105
See, e.g., ABA Draft Amendments, supra note 104, at 7-9 standard 31(a)(xi), (b)(i)(iii); see also Joseph, supra note 103, at 19.
106
ABA Draft Amendments, supra note 104, at 10 standard 32(a)-(c); see also Joseph,
supra note 104, at 19.
107
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (prohibiting unlawfully obstructing
another party’s access to evidence, unlawfully altering, destroying or concealing a
document or other material having potential evidentiary value, and counseling or
assisting another person in any such act); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c)(d) (prohibiting dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR
7-109(A) (1980) (prohibiting suppression of any evidence that a lawyer or his client has a
legal obligation to reveal or produce).
108
Fenwick, supra note 17, at 6.
109
Id. (“Courts are increasingly critical of the ‘ostrich head-in-the-sand’ mentality.
Recent decisions require early and thorough review of a company’s electronic files.”).
110
See In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (vacating discovery
order that had granted unfettered access to product liability Defendant’s databases);
Wright v. AmSouth Bancorp., 320 F.3d 1198, 1205 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial of
broad discovery request in ADEA illegal termination case); Southern Diagnostic Assocs.
v. Bencosme, 833 So. 2d 801, 802-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (per curiam) (quashing
trial court’s order as entailing overly broad inspection of subpoena recipient’s computer
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system). Cf. In re Honeywell Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. M8-85, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20602, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2003) (requiring that non-party to produce certain
information in electronic form, but rejecting request as to the other, more open-ended set
of information).
111
Practitioner Reacts to 2nd Circuit Electronic Discovery Decision, supra note 86.
112
306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002).
113
Id. at 111-12.
114
Brownstone, supra note 6, § II(A)(2)(C), at 4-6.
115
Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002).
116
212 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
117
For a veritable “how to not” fulfill the preservation, collection and production
obligations, see the parade of horribles listed in Brownstone, supra note 6, § II(A)(5), at
12-13.
118
Metro. Opera Ass’n, 212 F.R.D. at 180 (emphasis added).
119
Rule 37 grants the trial court wide latitude to craft sanctions for the enforcement of
discovery rules, ranging from the exclusion of evidence to granting a default judgment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
120
“Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably or
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(2001).
121
Metro. Opera Ass’n, 212 F.R.D. at 174.
122
See Jason Krause, Discovery Channels: Electronic Documents Are Vital to Building a
Case, so Don’t Get Papered Over, 88 A.B.A.J. 48 (2002) (“[T]he first rule of electronic
discovery is to negotiate with the other side.”).
123
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
124
Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at iv (“[P]arties are well-served by an early
discussion about the issues in dispute, the types of information sought, the likely sources
and locations of such information, and the realistic costs of identifying, locating,
retrieving, reviewing, and producing.”).
125
In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 444 (D.N.J. 2002). The court
denied “Defendants’ [request] for . . . full reimbursement for paper copying costs” where
Defendants had “dumped” more than three million pages on Plaintiffs, and also denied
“Defendants’ [request] . . . that the Plaintiffs pay one-half the cost of scanning documents
[i]nto electronic form” in favor of requiring Plaintiffs “to pay the nominal cost of
duplicating compact discs.” Id.
126
Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 16 cmt. 3.a (“Parties Should Include Electronic
Discovery Issues in Their Rule 26 Disclosures and Conferences”); see also Isom, supra
note 18, at 12 (discussing incentive for both sides - each of which will typically be both a
requesting and a producing party - to explore issues such as “the scope of the duty to
preserve evidence”).
127
Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 16 cmt. 3(a); accord Carroll, supra note 97, at 4.
But see Marcus, supra note 39, at 19 n.15 (declining to expand the initial disclosure
obligations).
128
ABA Draft Amendments, supra note 104, at 7. Draft Standard 31(a)(v)(a)-(k)’s
expressly non-exhaustive list of platforms mentions “databases; networks; computer
systems, including legacy systems; servers; archives; back up or disaster recovery
systems; tapes, discs, drives, cartridges and other storage media; laptops; personal
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computers; Internet data; and personal digital assistants [PDA’s].” Id. (capitalization and
sub-section letters omitted).
129
Marcus, supra note 39, at 17.
130
Id. at 6 n.2; see also Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil
Litigation, Federal Judicial Center, at 16-19,
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ElecDi01.pdf/$file/ElecDi01.pdf (last visited
Mar. 14, 2004) (posting an excellent pretrial conference checklist at the FRCP
Committee’s interim website).
131
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6).
132
Antonucci, supra note 2, at 6.
133
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